

ISLE OF MAN FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY

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Preventing Financial Crime

Analysis of firms' data

(2018 and 2019)

BANKS

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1. Introduction and Key Findings for Banks

- 1.1 The Isle of Man Financial Services Authority's ("the Authority") regulatory objectives¹ include "the reduction of financial crime". The Authority receives, and analyses, annual AML/CFT data from regulated and registered entities to help it monitor AML/CFT threats and trends in, and across, sectors. Reports are prepared to help show a view across sectors², excluding gambling, that are subject to the Island's AML/CFT framework. The Authority also uses this information to help with its risk assessment of sectors, and individual firms.
- 1.2 This report is focused on those firms whose primary business is that of being a **Bank** (deposit taking). Reports for other sectors are also produced.
- 1.3 Generally, Banks in the Isle of Man provide a range of products and services to local and international customers. Such services include current and savings accounts, loans, foreign exchange and treasury services, and payments. Some also have permissions for investment business and general insurance. In the majority of cases, Banks are part of wider banking groups with the associated governance and control frameworks in place that come with such bigger entities.
- 1.4 This report provides an analysis of two years' of data and covers areas such as the geographical profile of customers and beneficial owners, Banks' assessment of customer risk, reporting and monitoring of financial crime and sanctions, and the use of introducers and third parties.
- 1.5 **Table 1** below provides information on the population of **Banks** who were required to submit the annual AML/CFT data return for December 2019 and December 2018.

	December 2019	December 2018				
Number of Banks	10	12				

Table 1: Population of banks for the purpose of this Report

1.6 The analysis confirms that the client base is diverse, with a wide geographical spread of customers by residency, beneficial ownership and location of activity (for example where funds flow to and from). There is therefore a significant cross border aspect to the Island's banking sector. The data also confirms that a substantial portion of

¹ as set out in the Financial Services Act 2008 ("FSA08")

² The data does not include information from the small number of firms who are regulated only for bureau de change, agency payment services, or cheque cashing. These firms currently submit different AML/CFT statistical data which is analysed separately.

business is conducted on a non face to face basis, with some also through introducers. Banks also reported that they do undertake business with foreign PEPs.

1.7 The above profile, coupled with the nature of products and services offered by Banks results in a higher inherent risk of Banks being exposed to a range of money laundering, terrorist financing, and sanctions threats. The importance of Banks having strong and effective monitoring and control frameworks is therefore paramount.

2. Objectives

- 2.1 The gathering and analysis of data from firms about AML/CFT helps the Authority to achieve the regulatory objective of *"the reduction of financial crime"*.
- 2.2 The data informs the Authority's understanding of the *inherent risks* that firms, and sectors, may pose, and supports the Authority's AML/CFT supervisory work utilising a risk based approach. Some information provided also relates to a firm's *control environment*. The information that must be reported is dependent on the type of activity a firm undertakes, for example a bank must report more information when compared to a financial advisory firm. Key areas of focus include:-
 - The jurisdictional risk profile of the customer base and ultimate beneficial owners;
 - The extent of non-face to face and introduced business undertaken by firms;
 - Identification and reporting of suspicious activity for both money laundering and terrorist financing;
 - Monitoring and screening processes adopted, including for sanctions;
 - How firms categorise customer risk;
 - The level of politically exposed persons in the system, and how these are identified;
 - The compliance and internal audit mechanisms;
 - Outsourcing of AML/CFT processes;
 - The payment methods accepted by firms in relation to incoming and outgoing transfers; and
 - The types of client or product / services provided.
- 2.3 The data underpins the Island's understanding of the wider financial crime environment and forms a key part of the National Risk Assessment process, alongside the specific quarterly financial flow data that the Authority receives from the Island's banking sector.

3. Customer risk profile – Banks

A. Geographical profile - residency

- 3.1 Firms are required to report their customer relationships according to the residency of the customer, based on the ISO country code standard. This information enables the Authority to consider jurisdictional risk, and the extent to which customers are linked to higher-risk jurisdictions, when assessing sectors and firms.
- 3.2 The total number of customer³ relationships reported by Banks as at 31 December 2019 was **421,684** (*2018: 635,937*), of which **36.6%** are resident in the Isle of Man (*2018: 25.8%*) and **22.2%** in the UK (*2018: 21.7%*).

At the end of 2019, Banks reported that **90.3%** of customers were <u>natural persons</u> (*2018: 90.9%*). Of the <u>natural persons</u>, **32.8%** are resident in the Isle of Man (*2018: 21.9%*) and **22.8%** in the UK (*2018: 22.5%*). Some of these customers will be customers of more than one firm that reports data.

Of the <u>non-natural persons</u>, the most common residency (of the legal arrangement) was the Isle of Man at **71.1%** (*2018: 64.9%*). The UK and the Channel Islands made up a further **18.3%** (*2018: 27.0%*).

The data reported by Banks on the residency of <u>non-natural customers</u> (legal arrangements) is not unexpected with the majority being from countries which have mature company and trust formation sectors. Further, Banks reported that **30.5%** of their non-natural customer book were customers introduced / managed by Isle of Man regulated trust and company service providers (**2018: 25.4%**).

Note: in 2018 one bank (a material reporter) was unable to report only Isle of Man situs customer data and instead reported data for the bank as a whole, including its business in the Channel Islands. This was corrected for 2019 data which has resulted in the material changes to overall customer numbers, and the reduction in the geographical exposure to the Channel Islands.

Tables 2a and 2b below provide a more detailed breakdown.

³ It should be noted that the quality of reporting varies across banks between "customers" and "accounts" for this purpose.

	Customer	Customer Customer			Total	customer
	relationships:		relationshi	relationship: Non-		ps (% of
	natural per	rsons (% of	natural pe	ersons ⁴ (%	<u>total</u>)	
	<u>total</u> custo	mers)	of <u>total</u> cu	stomers)		
	2019	2018	2019	2018	2019	2018
Isle of Man	29.6%	19.9%	7.0%	5.9%	36.6%	25.8%
Channel Islands	0.5%	12.8%	0.1%	1.2%	0.6%	14.0%
UK	20.6%	20.5%	1.7%	1.2%	22.3%	21.7%
EU (excludes EEA	7.3%	9.8%	0.2%	0.2%	7.5%	10.0%
and Switzerland)						
Other Europe	1.1%	1.1%	0.0%	0.1%	1.1%	1.2%
Africa	13.3%	9.9%	0.2%	0.1%	13.5%	10.0%
Americas	7.0%	6.4%	0.3%	0.3%	7.3%	6.7%
Asia (including	7.9%	7.0%	0.2%	0.1%	8.1%	7.1%
Middle East)						
Oceania	3.0%	3.5%	0.0%	0.0%	3.0%	3.5%
TOTAL	90.3%	90.9%	9.7%	9.1%	100%	100%

Table 2a: Total percentage of relationships based on residency of the customer

Table 2b: Top 10 countries by residency of the customer

Country of	Natural Per	rsons (% of	Country of	Non-natur	al persons
residence	total natural persons)		residence	(% of	total non-
				natural)	
	2019	2018		2019	2018
Isle of Man	32.8%	21.9%	Isle of Man	71.1%	64.9%
UK	22.8%	22.5%	UK	16.8%	13.5%
South Africa	10.5%	7.4%	BVI	1.5%	1.2%
USA	4.3%	3.9%	South Africa	1.4%	0.5%
UAE	2.5%	2.1%	UAE (new 2019)	1.1%	n/a
Australia	2.4%	2.5%	Ireland	0.9%	0.5%
Spain	1.6%	2.1%	Jersey	0.8%	7.4%
France	1.5%	2.1%	Cayman Islands	0.8%	0.7%
Japan	1.1%	n/a	Cyprus	0.7%	0.9%
(new in 2019)					
Zimbabwe (new	1.0%	n/a	Guernsey	0.7%	6.1%
2019)					
Jersey (not 2019)	n/a	8.9%	Malta (not 2019)	n/a	0.5%
Guernsey	n/a	5.2%			
(not 2019)					
TOTAL	81.0%	78.6%		95.7%	96.2%

⁴ For a corporate or trust customer the residency will likely be reported as the country of incorporation / establishment of that company or trust (or of the trustee).

3.3 In summary, the jurisdictional profile of the customer base for **Banks** is wide in its scope and therefore there is a resultant increased inherent risk of being exposed to a range of money laundering / terrorist finance threats.

Also see **section 4E** for information on banks' payment flows.

B. Geographical profile – residency of ultimate beneficial owners

3.4 Banks also provide services to non-natural customers ("entities") and must understand who the beneficial owners of such entities are.

Of the non-natural customer book, **38.2%** of beneficial owners are resident in the Isle of Man (*2018: 28.5%*), followed by the UK at **33.4%** (*2018: 41.7%*).

Note: some banks were not able to report complete residency data on beneficial owners of non-natural customers. Further, one bank (a material reporter) was not able to report any data for 2017, and for 2018 its data was based on the residency of all key account parties (i.e. including directors) and was therefore excluded for previous analysis purposes. However, this bank's data has been included within the figures for 2019 (noting it was still based on all key account parties).

Tables 3a and	3b below	provide a	more detailed	breakdown
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	Residency at Dece	ember 2019	Residency at December 2018		
	Beneficial	Entities	Beneficial	Entities	
	owners		owners		
Isle of Man	38.2%	71.1%	28.5%	64.9%	
Channel Islands	1.4%	1.5%	0.5%	13.5%	
UK	33.4%	16.8%	41.7%	13.5%	
EU (excludes EEA and Switzerland)	7.0%	2.3%	8.0%	2.3%	
Other Europe	2.8%	0.6%	3.3%	0.6%	
Africa	5.3%	2.4%	7.1%	1.4%	
Americas	4.4%	3.5%	4.6%	2.8%	
Asia (including Middle East)	6.4%	1.7%	5.6%	0.9%	
Oceania	1.1%	0.1%	0.7%	0.1%	
TOTAL	100%	100%	100%	100%	

Table 3a: Residenc	v of the	beneficial	owners o	f non-natural	customers
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		Country of residence of the beneficial owner (% of total number of beneficial owners)			
	2019	2018			
Isle of Man	38.2%	28.5%			
UK	33.4%	41.7%			
South Africa	3.2%	4.2%			
United Arab Emirates	1.7%	1.3%			
Ireland	1.5%	1.2%			
USA	1.4%	1.3%			
Switzerland	1.2%	1.4%			
Hong Kong (new in top 10 for 2019)	1.0%	-			
Italy	0.9%	1.5%			
Jersey (new in top 10 for 2019)	0.8%	-			
Cyprus (not in top 10 for 2019)	-	1.3%			
Kenya (not in top 10 for 2019)	-	1.2%			
TOTAL	83.3%	83.6%			

Table 3b: Top 10 countries by residency of the beneficial owner (of entities)

The jurisdictional profile of the beneficial owners of non-natural customers for **Banks** is relatively wide in its scope, albeit with a particular concentration of UBOs being resident in the Isle of Man and UK (**circa 71%**).

3.5 Similar to the residency profile for customers who are natural persons, the range of residency of UBOs is relatively wide in scope and therefore there is a resultant increased inherent risk of Banks being exposed to a range of money laundering / terrorist finance threats, including through more complex structures. Also see section 4E for information on banks' payment flows.

C. Politically exposed persons and other high risk customers

- 3.6 Tables 4a and 4b show customer relationships, as assessed by Banks, deemed to pose a higher risk of money laundering, and the level of politically exposed persons ("PEPs") among the customer base. PEPs⁵ include people with prominent public jobs who may be in a position to abuse their role for private gain.
- 3.7 At the end of 2019 Banks reported **2,057 customers who are, or are associated with, a PEP⁶ (2018: 1,702)**, including **1,624 related to foreign PEPs (2018: 1,318)**. Firms are required to identify PEPs at the start of a business relationship and, through effective monitoring, if any persons subsequently become PEPs. Firms are required by law to undertake enhanced checks and monitoring of all customers who are, or are

⁵ PEP is defined in the Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism Code 2019.

⁶ The actual number of individual (natural) PEPs may be lower than the number of customers reported.

associated with, foreign PEPs and any domestic PEPs who the Firm assesses as posing a higher risk.

	Number of PEP relationships (and as a % share of all relationships)			
	As at December As at December			
	2019 2018			
Customer who are, or are associated with,	2,057 (0.49%)	1,702 (0.27%)		
politically exposed persons (PEPs)				
Of which are foreign PEPs	1,624	1,318		
Of which are domestic PEPs	433	384		

Table 4a: PEP relationships

- 3.8 At the end of 2019 (and 2018), **all** Banks confirmed that they screen for PEPs at the commencement of a business relationship, and screen their customer records on a periodic basis to determine if a customer has become a PEP. For the latter the frequency of screening was generally daily for all customer risk types; noting one bank reported it screens weekly, and one reported it only screens on an annual basis.
- 3.9 At the end of 2019 Banks reported they had **10,015 higher risk customers** (**2018**: **14,659**); this includes customers who are categorised as being higher risk for reasons other than being a PEP. Where firms identify that customers pose a higher risk, either at the outset of a business relationship, or through an event that occurs during the business relationship, they are legally required to conduct enhanced customer due diligence.

Note: in 2018 one bank (a material reporter) was unable to report only Isle of Man situs customer data (for the purpose of risk categories) and instead reported data for the bank as a whole, including its business in the Channel Islands. This was rectified for 2019, hence the overall decrease in the total number of higher risk relationships reported.

	Number	C	of hig	h risk	customer
	relationships (total and new) (and as a				(and as a %
	share of total / new custor				
	relationships ⁷)				
	December 2019 December 2018				
Total high risk customers (includes any PEPs	10,0)15 (2.38%)	14,	659 (2.31%)
assessed as higher risk)					

Table 4b: High-risk customer relationships

⁷ Some banks reported new customer relationship data based on number of new accounts, rather than unique customer numbers.

New high risk customers on-boarded in the	2,598 (5.91%)	1,973 (3.45%)
reporting period (includes any PEPs assessed		
as higher risk)		

- 3.10 Overall, PEPs and other high risk customers represent a **relatively small proportion** of the total customer base of Banks. Note that the same individual customers may appear more than once in these figures because individuals and businesses may have multiple financial relationships.
- 3.11 The number of new high risk customers on-boarded, as a proportion of all new customers on-boarded, increased in 2019 compared to 2018.
- 3.12 Banks also reported that they review the customer risk assessment and CDD information for all high risk (including higher risk PEPs) relationships at least annually.

4. Tackling Financial Crime – Banks

A. Resourcing the fight against financial crime

4.1 To effectively monitor and address the risk that persons abuse the financial system for money laundering and terrorist financing requires a significant amount of firms' time and resources. As at 31 December 2019 Banks reported that they collectively employ (including through contracts for services) 2,100 staff in the Isle of Man (2018: 2,060), of which 74 (4%) were reported as being in compliance and prevention of financial crime roles (2018: 96 / 5%).

It should be noted that compliance roles are not solely focused on financial crime. Banks also reported **3 FTE compliance / financial crime vacancies** at the end of 2019 (**2018**: **8**).

4.2 Relevant staff require ongoing training to ensure they have the effective knowledge to help detect and prevent their firm from being misused by criminals. In the year ended 31 December 2019, Banks reported that 2,155 general refresher or induction / detailed training places were filled (2018: 2,065). This effectively represented 100% of total staff employed (including directors) (2018: 100%).

In addition, Banks reported that **373 staff (18%)** received additional specialist training (**2018: 407 / 20%**).

B. Outsourcing of processes to group entities or third parties

- 4.3 Information is obtained on the outsourcing of certain activities or functions to group entities or third parties. Where outsourcing occurs firms should have robust monitoring and control processes in place, as responsibility remains with the firm. Information is requested in respect of the following:-
 - Customer on-boarding (including for risk assessments, collection of due diligence, screening, and business acceptance);
 - Ongoing monitoring;
 - MLRO and Compliance activity (for AML/CFT); and
 - Staff screening and take-on.
- 4.4 It was evident from the reporting by Banks that they outsource a range of activity relating to the above, including within their wider groups and, to a more limited extent, third parties. The most extensive use of outsourcing was for the screening of staff at take-on, and the least use was, as expected, for MLRO and Compliance activity. There was also an increase in group outsourcing in respect of ongoing monitoring (from 2 to 4 banks). Table 5 below provides more information (for 2019 only).

Description	Undertaken	Outsourced	Outsourced
	by the Bank	to Group	to Third
			Parties
Client on-boarding ⁸			
Customer risk assessments	Yes - all	Yes - 1	Yes - 1
Collection of customer due diligence	Yes - all	Yes - 3	Yes - 3
Customer screening	Yes - all	Yes - 1	Yes - 1
Customer acceptance ⁹	Yes - all	Yes - 1	Yes - 1
Ongoing monitoring	Yes - all	Yes - 4	Yes - 2
MLRO & Compliance activity ¹⁰			
MLRO / DMLRO activity	Yes – except 1	Yes - 1	No
Compliance activity	Yes – except 2	Yes - 3	No
Staff screening and take-on ¹¹	Yes - 6	Yes - 6	Yes - 5

Table 5: Outsourcing of AML/CFT activity

⁸ Outsourcing may be for only customer segments or part of a process.

⁹ Outsourcing of business acceptance was for very specific purposes, and subject to the consent of the Authority. ¹⁰ Any full outsourcing was intra-group within the Isle of Man, for the reported exceptions (including to a "group compliance function"). One bank also but part outsourced to within group outside the Isle of Man.

¹¹ All 4 Banks which did <u>not</u> undertake this "in-house" reported that they outsourced to their groups. A range of Banks also outsourced part of the process to third parties.

C. Monitoring for, and reporting of, financial crime

- 4.5 The law requires employees of firms to report knowledge or suspicion of money laundering within their firm, to their MLRO. In the year ended 31 December 2019, **831** cases of concern, suspicion or knowledge of money laundering were either identified by staff, generated through automated processes, or identified from other intelligence sources, and reported to the firms' MLROs (**2018: 1,163**). No reports were made that were terrorism related (**2018: 1**).
- 4.6 MLROs must consider these reports, and decide whether a formal submission to the Isle of Man Financial Intelligence Unit¹² ("FIU") is justified, and must be registered with the FIU's "Themis" system to be able to make reports. At the end of 2018 and 2019, all Banks reported they were registered on "Themis".
- 4.7 In 2019, after investigation by MLROs, 447 cases of knowledge or suspicion of money laundering were reported to the FIU (2018: 519). No reports were made that were terrorism related (2018: None). Further, Banks reported 83 cases to the FIU regarding general intelligence (2018: 66). It is noticeable that the reporting of general intelligence continues to increase since the introduction of that mechanism being available (in 2017 only 26 cases were reported).
- 4.8 In 2019 Banks also handled 329 requests from law enforcement and other competent authorities (2018: 349). Of these, 265 explicitly related to money laundering (2018: 276). There were none for terrorism (2018: 1).
- 4.9 Engagement between the FIU, other law enforcement agencies and financial firms is a crucial component that supports investigations and prosecutions, not only in the Isle of Man but as part of international cooperation. It is evident that Banks form a significant part of this infrastructure.

Description	Year ended 31 Dec 2019	Year ended 31 Dec 2018
Number of internal Money Laundering disclosures to the MLRO	831	1,163
Number of external Money Laundering disclosures to the FIU	447	519
Number of internal Terrorist Financing disclosures to the MLRO	0	1
Number of external Terrorist Financing disclosures to the FIU	0	0

Table 6: Liaising with the authorities

¹² See <u>https://www.fiu.im/</u>

Section 24 disclosures to the FIU	83	66
Enquiries received from law enforcement authorities	211	244
Of which were Money Laundering related	192	234
Of which were Terrorism related	0	1
Enquiries received from other competent authorities	118	105
Of which were Money Laundering related	73	42
Of which were Terrorism related	0	0

D. Refusing and blocking services because of financial crime risk

4.10 Concerns relating to financial crime may lead to firms turning away a prospective customer. In the year ended 31 December 2019 Banks reported they **declined 36** potential new relationships because of financial crime, terrorism or sanctions related concerns (**2018: 65**). In some cases, Banks would not always have knowledge or suspicion of financial crime but customers may have posed an unacceptable risk.

Of the declined cases, **75%** were natural persons resident outside the Isle of Man (**2018: 80%**).

 Table 7b provides a further breakdown.

4.11 Firms are required to monitor ongoing business relationships and may cease to provide services because of their own financial crime risk appetite, or may terminate relationships under certain circumstances, including liaising with the FIU if a matter is subject to "consent"¹³. During the year ended 31 December 2019 Banks terminated 211 existing relationships because of financial crime, terrorism or sanctions related concerns (*2018: 253*).

Of the terminated cases, **48%** were natural persons resident outside the Isle of Man (**2018: 61%**).

The total number of **terminated cases** equated to **less than 0.5%** of all customer relationships that were closed or terminated for both 2018 and 2019.

 Table 7b provides a further breakdown.

¹³ Section 154 of the Proceeds of Crime Act provides a reporting mechanism called "an authorised disclosure", which is a means by which a defence against money laundering can be obtained by a firm. Making an authorised disclosure can be used as the vehicle to seek consent to commit a prohibited act (i.e. possessing, acquiring, moving known or suspected criminal property).

4.12 In addition to terminating relationships, firms may be requested by law enforcement agencies to block or freeze accounts, or may themselves put additional controls around accounts if information is required from a customer. As at the end of 2019 there were 149 accounts blocked or frozen for money laundering or terrorism (2018: 130).

Description	Year ende	d 31 Dec	Year ended 31 Dec	
	2019		2018	
	Number	Asset	Number	Asset
		Value		Value
		£'000		£'000
Number of potential new customer	36		65	
relationships declined for ML/FT or				
sanctions purposes				
Number of customer relationships	211		253	
terminated for ML/FT or sanction				
purposes				
Blocked or frozen accounts for AML/CFT	149	43,052	130	38,098
purposes – subject to consent including				
restraint orders etc.				
Blocked or frozen accounts for any other	1,609	16,269	1,140	14,822
purpose (e.g. gone away)				

Table 7a: disrupting provision of services - summary

Note: not all banks were able to accurately report the number and value of "blocked or frozen accounts for any other purpose". Some banks also include specific dormant accounts for this purpose.

Table 7b: disrupting provision of services – declined and terminated business for ML/FT or sanctions purposes

Description	Declined		Terminated	
	2019	2018	2019	2018
Natural persons IOM	1	6	87	62
Natural persons non-IOM	27	52	102	154
Charities - IOM	0	0	0	0
Charities – non IOM	0	0	0	0
Corporate / trust – managed by IOM	6	0	5	15
TCSPs				
Corporate / trust - other	2	7	17	22
Other customers	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	36	65	211	253

E. The Isle of Man banking system as gatekeeper

4.13 When it comes to the material flow of funds into and out of the Island, the banking sector plays an important gatekeeper role. Data on the monetary value and volume of inflows and outflows for banks including origin and destination of funds is provided to the Authority quarterly, and shared with the FIU. The Authority uses the payment flow data to help inform its risk assessment of Banks and consider thematic or Bank specific supervisory review work. **Table 8** below provides a breakdown by geographic region.

	12mth Infl £billion (%)	ows Value	12mth Outflows Value £billion (%)		
	2019	2018	2019	2018	
TOTAL ALL COUNTRIES	87.0	77.0	76.7	67.6	
Of which UK	41.9 (48%)	42.8 (55%)	31.6 (41%)	35.5 (53%)	
Of which inter IOM	3.3 (4%)	2.3 (3%)	1.8 (2%)	2.2 (3%)	
Of which Channel Islands	4.6 (5%)	5.3 (7%)	2.6 (4%)	2.9 (4%)	
Of which EU	20.7 (24%)	10.1 (13%)	20.1 (26%)	9.2 (14%)	
Of which other Europe	2.2 (3%)	2.6 (3%)	2.3 (3%)	2.9 (4%)	
Of which Americas	8.6 (10%)	9.4 (12%)	10.9 (14%)	8.5 (12%)	
Of which Africa	3.0 (3%)	2.1 (3%)	3.2 (4%)	2.7 (4%)	
Of which Asia (incl. Middle East)	2.4 (3%)	2.1 (3%)	3.5 (5%)	3.1 (5%)	
Of which Oceania	0.3 (less	0.3 (less	0.7 (1%)	0.6 (1%)	
	than 0.5%)	than 0.5%)			
Highest risk countries (29)	12mth Inflows		12mth Outflows		
	2019	2018	2019	2018	
Total value £billion	0.24	0.25	0.22	0.30	
As a % of total flow	0.28%	0.32%	0.29%	0.44%	

Table 8: Payment flows ¹⁴ (based on cumulative data to Dec 2019 data, 12 months)

4.14 99% of all inflows and 97% of all outflows are to or from jurisdictions of lower or at least equivalent level of risk to the UK, which is the largest trading partner of the Isle of Man. In 2019 **1%** of all inflows (**2018: 2%**) and **3%** of outflows (**2018: 4%**) were

¹⁴ Payment Flow data is not fully complete, for example not all banks are reporting sterling flows in faster payments / bacs.

connected to **higher risk jurisdictions**¹⁵. However, only **0.28%** of all inflows and **0.29%** of all outflows were from / to the **29 highest risk countries**. The payment data is not inconsistent with the geographic spread of the customer base of Banks.

- 4.15 Consistent with 2018, the largest inflows from the highest risk countries were from Kenya. Nigeria was the second highest, with Turkey third. In line with incoming financial flows, Kenya was the highest risk jurisdiction which received most of the overall outflow, albeit taking in **only 0.09%** (*2018: 0.24%*) of all funds leaving the IoM (and the 40th highest receiver of IoM outflow overall (2018: 31st highest)). The second highest was Turkey. The Congo, Nigeria and Mozambique were also identified. As the Isle of Man has some banks which are part of African headquartered banking groups, these flows are not unexpected.
- 4.16 For the receipt and withdrawal / movement of funds into / out of bank accounts, banks reported that the predominant methods used were bank transfer, cheques, and debit card. Credit cards, payment providers (e.g. Paypal) and bankers' drafts were also used.
- 4.17 **4 Banks** also reported that the acceptance and payment of cash is usual, and **2 Banks** reported it was occasional or by exception. Strong controls, monitoring and appropriate limits around the use of cash is therefore important to help prevent lower level domestic laundering.

5. Managing and reporting of sanctions – Banks

- 5.1 It is important that firms have robust controls in place to ensure they comply with local and international sanctions. In order to help achieve this firms must have appropriate monitoring and screening tools to identify whether any of their customers (existing or prospective) are sanctioned individuals or organisations, and also to make sure funds paid / received are not made to / from sanctioned individuals or organisations.
- 5.2 At the end of 2019, **all** Banks confirmed that they screen for sanctions at the commencement of a business relationship, and screen their customer records on a periodic basis to determine if a customer has become subject to sanctions (which includes terrorism lists). For the latter, the frequency of screening was predominantly daily (through automated monitoring), with the exception of one bank which reported it screened weekly.

¹⁵ For the purposes of this report, higher risk jurisdictions (including those considered the *highest risk*) are those identified by the Authority via a composite rating derived from the higher of the Aon Risk Index scores and the Basle AML/CFT index.

5.3 At the end of 2019, for outward and inward payments, Banks reported the following information in relation to screening for sanctions:-

SWIFT (international) payments

- For outward payments **all** <u>relevant</u> Banks screen in real time or prior to the payment being released this screening was for the sender of the payment, the beneficiary, and other relevant parties.
- For inward payments all <u>relevant</u> Banks screen in real time (with one exception, which was "after event") this screening was for the remitter, the beneficiary, and other relevant parties. Banks also reported that they monitor incoming payments for complete payer / payee information (as required under wire transfer regulations) either in real time or after event.

BACS and Faster Payments (sterling domestic payments only¹⁶)

Banks reported that they generally **do not** screen UK sterling payments (in and out) for sanction purposes. There were however some exceptions to this reported by 4 Banks, noting some screening of senders, remitters and beneficiaries (in and out).

- 5.4 There is always potential that firms hold the funds of sanctioned individuals or organisations, mainly because such individuals / organisations will not have been subject to sanctions when they were originally accepted as a customer. In such cases, firms may be required to block or freeze assets for financial sanctions purposes. As at the end of 2019 there were **17 accounts blocked or frozen** for financial sanctions purposes (**2018: 22**) with an aggregate value of **£3.9 million** (**2018: £4.2 million**).
- 5.5 The law requires firms to identify and report any suspected breach of sanctions¹⁷ to the Financial Intelligence Unit. In practice, these reports will be made by a firm's MLRO or Deputy MLRO using Themis (with processes in place internally for employees to report to the MLRO / Deputy MLRO). In the year ended 31 December 2019, 1 disclosure was made for suspected breaches of sanctions (2018: 1).

¹⁶ Domestic means Isle of Man, UK, Gibraltar and Channel Islands for this purpose.

¹⁷ With reference to the "Sanctions List", which means the list of persons who are currently subject to international sanctions which apply in the Isle of Man: this list is maintained by the Customs and Excise Division of the Treasury of the Isle of Man.

Description	31 Dec 2019		31 Dec 2018	
	Number	Asset Value	Number	Asset Value
		£'000		£'000
Number of disclosures made for	1		1	
suspected breach of sanctions				
Accounts blocked or frozen in the year	36	1,213	20	1,572
for financial sanctions purposes				
Blocked or frozen accounts for financial	19 ¹⁸	0	0	0
sanctions purposes released in the year				
Number and value of blocked or frozen	17	3,916	22	4,200
accounts for financial sanctions				
purposes as at the year end				

Table 9: managing and reporting sanctions

6. Delivery of services: face to face, use of introducers and third parties – Banks

- 6.1 How a firm delivers its products and services to customers can range from direct relationships with face to face interaction before a business relationship is established, or an occasional transaction conducted, to situations where relationships are established remotely directly by the customer, or through introducers / third parties (and sometimes through more than one layer of introducer / third party).
- 6.2 In 2019, Banks reported **43,924** new relationships (*2018: 57,242*). The actual number of <u>unique new customers</u> is lower than the above numbers as some banks reported this data on an "account" basis.
- 6.3 On a unique customer basis Banks reported 33,686 new customers in 2019 (2018: 29,356). Of these new customers, 60% was reported as direct business (2018: 56%), whereas introduced business accounted for 27% (2018: 33%).
- 6.4 In 2019, on a "best endeavours basis", Banks reported that **58%** of new customers were either met by the Bank or a related party to the Bank (**2018: 55%**), and **42%** relationships were established on a non face to face basis (including through introducers) (**2018: 45%**).
- 6.5 For <u>introduced business</u>, the main source of introductions were from Isle of Man Based TCSPs, group offices, and in one case overseas financial advisory firms. For

¹⁸ This was connected to one individual and related entities appearing on an OFAC list in the period but that was subsequently removed.

customers introduced to Banks, the top 5 residency of the introducers (in terms of the number of clients introduced) for both 2019 and 2018 were:-

- South Africa
- UK
- Isle of Man
- United Arab Emirates
- France

Even where introducers are utilised, Banks reported that, in many cases, they obtain evidence of verification of identity of the customer from the introducer, rather than utilising the concessions available in law (relying on the introducer to hold that evidence, where an introducer is eligible to do so).

Annex 1 – Data Quality

The following matters should be noted in relation to the data provided in this report:-

- The report is based on data provided by firms; the Authority does not check the accuracy of data for every firm but may raise questions with firms.
- Parts of some firms' data is provided on a "best endeavours basis" and therefore cannot be considered as 100% accurate.
- The figures for customer numbers, including PEPs, is based on a simple sum of individual firms' data. A customer of one firm may also have relationships with another and be counted twice in this data.
- In 2018, one bank was unable to report only Isle of Man situs customer data and instead reported data for the bank as a whole, including its business in the Channel Islands. This matter has been corrected for 2019. This bank is a material reporter.
- The quality of reporting varies across Banks between "customers" and "accounts" for various data sets.
- Banks' capability to accurately report the split of new business between those established on a face to face versus non-face to face varies, as does the ability to report introduced business information.